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Abstract 
This paper is the text prepared for the keynote address of the EUSN 2017 conference in 
Mainz, Germany. A short presentation of concepts reflects in part the foundations of neo-
structural sociology (NSS) and its use of social and organisational network analyses, com-
bined with other methodologies, to better understand the roles of structure and culture in indi-
vidual and collective agency. The presentation shows how NSS accounts for institutional 
change by focusing on the importance of combined relational infrastructures and rhetorics. 
Specific characteristics of institutional entrepreneurs who punch above their weight in institu-
tionalization processes are introduced for that purpose, particularly the importance of multi-
status oligarchs, status heterogeneity, high-status inconsistencies, collegial oligarchies, con-
flicts of interests and rhetorics of relative/false sacrifice. Two empirical examples illustrate 
this approach. The first case focuses on a network study of the Commercial Court of Paris, a 
450-year-old judicial institution. The second case focuses on a network study of a field-
configuring event (the so-called Venice Forum) lobbying for the emergence of a new Europe-
an jurisdiction, the Unified Patent Court, and its attempt to create a common intellectual prop-
erty regime for the continent. For sociologists, both examples involve “studying up”: they are 
cases of public/private joint regulation of markets bringing together these ingredients of insti-
tutionalization. The conclusion suggests future lines of research that NSS opens for the study 
of institutionalization, in particular using the dynamics of multi-level networks. One of the 
main issues raised by this approach is its contribution to the study of democratic deficits in a 
period of intense institutional change in Europe. 
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1  I would like to thank the committees of EUSN 2017, particularly Marina Hennig, for the invitation 
to present this keynote address. 
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Introduction 
 
The outline of this address is the following. 
It will first briefly present a few concepts 
that belong to the foundations of neo-
structural sociology (NSS) (for a synthesis, 
see Lazega, 2006, 2012a). The purpose of 
this sociology is to use social and organi-
zational network analyses, combined with 
other methodologies, to better understand 
the roles of structure and culture in the 
processes of collective agency. It will then 
look at how NSS contributes to under-
standing institutional change as collective 
agency by focusing on the importance of 
relational infrastructures and rhetorics. It 
will next identify specific characteristics of 
institutional entrepreneurs who punch 
above their weight in institutionalization 
processes: the importance of high-status 
inconsistencies, collegial oligarchies, mul-
ti-status oligarchs, conflicts of interests and 
rhetorics is hereby introduced. Two empir-
ical examples will be provided to illustrate 
this approach. For the sociologist, both ex-
amples involve ‘studying up’: they are cas-
es of public/private joint regulation of 
markets looking at these elements of insti-
tutionalization. The first case focuses on 
the Commercial Court of Paris, a 450-year-
old judicial institution. The second case 
focuses on the emerging European Unified 
Patent Court. The conclusion suggests fu-
ture lines of research that NSS opens up 
based on the study of institutionalization, 
in particular in the dynamics of multi-level 
networks. One of the main issues raised by 
this approach is that of democratic deficits 
in a period of intense institutional change 
in Europe.  
 
Foundations of neo-structural sociology 
 
Neo-structural sociology brings together, 
very generally, structure, culture and ac-
tion (both individual and collective action) 
in the organizational society. It relies on 
sophisticated analyses of socio-
organizational networks, if possible multi-
level and dynamic, and enriched with data 
on culture and behavior2. The focus is on 
collective action, and especially on model-
ling its generic social processes (learning 
and socialization, particularistic solidarity 
and discriminations, social control and 
conflict resolution, regulation and institu-
tionalization). To theorize and model these 
processes, it is important to use the notion 
of relational infrastructures of collective 
action, particularly of collective action that 
relies on personalized ties between peers 
for coordination, elsewhere called collegi-
ality3.  
In order to frame the issue theoreti-
cally, relationships, as indicators of inter-
dependencies, are defined as both channels 
for resources with, and symbolic or moral 
commitments to, exchange partners. It is 
because relationships have both dimen-
sions that they can become infrastructural. 
Indeed, stabilized relationships are usually 
part of structures that are identified locally, 
in the entourage of the actors, as relational 
sub-structures with which we are all famil-
iar, such as direct reciprocity, indirect reci-
procity, transitivity, etc.; but also part of 
what can be called relational infrastruc-
tures, such as vertical patterns of differen-
tiations (mainly heterogeneous forms of 
status coexisting in complex ways) and 
horizontal patterns of differentiations 
(mainly social niches in a system of nich-
es) at a morphological level. In particular, 
relational infrastructures combined with 
norms facilitate generic social processes 
helping members manage the dilemmas of 
their collective actions. Using combina-
                                                 
2  Contemporary neo-structuralism is different 
from the structuralism of Claude Lévi-
Strauss and of the 1960s mainly because it 
relies on a theory of individual and 
collective action to provide a new 
fundamental link between structure and 
process. The articulation between culture 
and structure, however, was already present 
in the ‘old’ structuralism. 
3  This also means that understanding collec-
tive action in ideal, typically speaking bu-
reaucratized settings, based on routines, hie-
rarchy and impersonal ties, does not need 
much social network analysis. 
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tions of relational infrastructures and rela-
tional sub-structures in social and organi-
zational networks, we have modelled sev-
eral generic processes4, such as solidarities 
with direct and indirect reciprocity in vari-
ous multiplex networks; social control in 
lateral control regimes using personal rela-
tionships for collective goals; collective 
learning with various kinds of advice seek-
ing networks; and regulation and institu-
tionalization as political processes, that are 
the focus of this talk. Thus, NSS reframes 
the recursive dynamics of social structure 
and social processes. 
 
A focus on relational infrastructures in 
institutionalization processes 
 
Institutions are commonly and broadly de-
fined as rules, norms, and beliefs that de-
scribe reality for actors, explaining what is 
and is not, what can be acted upon and 
what cannot, and how (Hall & Taylor, 
1996; Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 2007; Bathelt 
& Glückler, 2014). The focus is on the 
norms, mutual expectations and beliefs 
about issues and the legitimate organiza-
tional ways in which related behavior has 
to be normed and governed. A classical 
question in the social sciences is: ‘How do 
such institutions emerge?’ Our work in this 
area owes much to collaboration, initiated 
by Harrison White in 1995, with institu-
tional economists, in particular Olivier Fa-
vereau (see Favereau and Lazega, 2002; 
Lazega 2016a). In the era of ‘governance’ 
(weakening of command and control 
framework of States) that we witnessed 
over the last decades, this neo-structural 
sociology has blossomed in economic so-
ciology, by focusing on collective action in 
joint (public authorities and private actors, 
including business) regulation of markets. 
Since 1996, NSS has owed much to Julien 
                                                 
4  Neo-structural publications about these pro-
cesses including theoretical, empirical and 
methodological work developing a neo-
structural theory of institutionalization are 
available online: www.elazega.fr > 
http://elazega.fr/?m=201709 
Brailly, Catherine Comet, Fabien Eloire, 
Guillaume Favre, Lise Mounier, Jaime 
Montes-Lihn, Mohamed Oubenal, Elise 
Penalva-Icher, Alvaro Pina-Stranger, Tom 
Snijders, Paola Tubaro, Marta Varanda, 
and many others.  
Contemporary thinking about the 
emergence of institutions is dominated in 
sociology by a variety of neo-institutional 
perspectives focusing on ‘institutional en-
trepreneurs’ (DiMaggio, 1988) who elabo-
rate on taken-for-granted cultural catego-
ries, classifications, rules and procedures 
that include beliefs and codes stabilizing 
action into routines. In this literature, struc-
tural dimensions of regulation are largely 
ignored. Yet in his work on what he calls 
‘precarious values’, Selznick (1957) al-
ready provides an early combination of a 
structural and an institutional perspective 
in sociology. A precarious value is one that 
is essential to the viability of the collectivi-
ty but in which most members may have 
no direct stake. In this illustration of the 
entanglement of structure and culture, a 
value is therefore precarious because it is 
always in danger of losing its flag carriers 
and representatives, that is, the active sup-
port by organized interest groups and elites 
that helps preserve it as a candidate for 
priority on the list of all competing values. 
We argue that, in organizational so-
cieties (Perrow, 1991), where power is ex-
tremely concentrated, this relational and 
cultural perspective enriches the study of 
institutionalization processes by focusing 
on their often collegial, elitist and person-
alized nature. In this process, the selection 
of priority norms and the personalized se-
lection of the authorities who champion 
them is an important process in the crea-
tion of frames of reference that become 
taken for granted over time, and thus insti-
tutionalized. Therefore, the creation of an 
oligarchy of actors, who are able to guide 
the regulatory process and to mobilize fol-
lowers by helping them align with new 
rules, are key underlying mechanisms that 
belong to the institutionalization process as 
theorized by Selznick and encapsulated in 
his notion of precarious values. 
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Today the focus is on the process of 
regulation and institutionalization. There is 
something remarkable in the way relational 
infrastructures are mobilized in political, 
regulatory, institution building processes: 
their efficiency comes from the constitu-
tion of collegial oligarchies whose mem-
bers take advantage of situations of con-
flicts of interests to concentrate power 
(Lazega, 2012b).  
 
High-status inconsistencies and conflicts of 
interests: Punching above their weight in 
institutionalization process 
 
We are not equal in our capacity to defend 
our regulatory interests, even in egalitarian 
systems. Very generally speaking, neo-
structural sociology starts with the princi-
ple that divergent interests and forced in-
terdependencies complexify the regulatory 
process and development of institutions. It 
requires an understanding of interdepend-
encies as relational infrastructures that are 
often conflictual, dynamic and multi-level. 
Modelling social processes in terms of 
networks adds much to the reflection on 
the way individual and collective agents 
defend their regulatory interests in institu-
tionalization processes, and therefore to 
joint regulation as a social and political 
process. 
Selznick’s connection between 
structure and culture is still illuminating 
today with respect to understanding institu-
tion building by small networks of top-
level institutional entrepreneurs that we 
call collegial oligarchies. At a very high 
level of generality, defining norms for col-
lective action, i.e. the political process in a 
collectivity, depends upon who are the ac-
tors promoting these rules, what are their 
strategies to carry out this regulation with-
in the system of their interdependencies, 
and what are the relational infrastructures 
that they are able to create and mobilize to 
do that. In this spirit, neo-structural sociol-
ogy looks at institution building by explor-
ing the relational dimension of ‘institution-
al work’ (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 
2011) or political work (Lahille, 2015; 
Christopoulos and Ingold, 2015), i.e. at the 
system of interdependencies in collegial 
oligarchies of institutional entrepreneurs 
involved in institutional framing. 
In particular the neo-structural ap-
proach to regulatory activity reveals the 
ways in which strategic agents politicise 
their exchanges, especially by building re-
lational infrastructures, for example, social 
niches or forms of social status. Control-
ling those relational infrastructures gives 
them a structural position that enables 
them to frame or guide the negotiation of 
rules, including building forms of consen-
sus and normative alignments that are 
more or less long lasting. Observing the 
inconsistencies between these forms of sta-
tus proves to be a powerful tool in the 
analysis of regulatory process5. The notion 
that different, heterogeneous dimensions of 
status could be socially inconsistent has a 
long history in sociology (Hughes, 1945; 
Lenski, 1954)6. It helps with substantiating 
the complex link between political work 
and position within the structure because 
political actors, as institutional entrepre-
neurs, try to both accumulate power and 
increase their legitimacy. Indeed, in the po-
litical process, it is not enough to simply 
assert that the strongest impose their own 
rules. Rather, neo-structural analyses show 
that it is often improbable agents occupy-
ing heterogeneous and inconsistent dimen-
sions of social statuses, i.e. in a position of 
‘conflict of interest’, who have the greatest 
influence in the political work of institu-
tional transformation, of defining Selz-
nick’s ‘precarious values’ as priority rules.  
                                                 
5  These inconsistencies are also the reason for 
difficulties in properly specifying status in 
statistical network models (Lazega, Mou-
nier, Snijders and Tubaro, 2012). 
6  “Coexistence of a number of parallel verti-
cal hierarchies which are usually imper-
fectly correlated with each other. 
(…) Certain units may be consistently high 
or consistenly low, while others may com-
bine high standing with respect to certain 
status variables with low status with respect 
to other variables” (Lenski, 1954:405). 
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Examples of how relational infrastructure, 
particularly complex and inconsistent 
forms of status, matter in institutionaliza-
tion of norms in micro- or macro-political 
controversies (Lazega, 2001: chapter 8) 
abound. Analyses based on this approach 
show, for example, how financial indus-
tries play a specific role of ‘discrete regu-
lators’ (Huault & Richard, 2012). The 
study of regulation networks shared be-
tween public bodies and private agents 
shows how proactive and how capable of 
guiding regulatory work the latter are. The 
financial sector is not the only powerful 
agent in terms of institutional work but its 
traditionally dual (economic and political) 
character gives it a specific role in many 
regulatory processes. This is precisely be-
cause of its capacity to benefit from status 
heterogeneity, high-status inconsistencies 
and conflicts of interest. This allows it to 
become – in part – its own regulator, and 
to dominate and capture, for example, ju-
dicial institutions.  
 
Structure, culture and broken promises: 
Combining high-status inconsistency with 
rhetorics of sacrifice 
 
Why are members with several, heteroge-
neous, high and inconsistent forms of sta-
tus – multi-status oligarchs – particularly 
efficient as institutional entrepreneurs 
when operating in collegial oligarchies and 
using conflicts of interests? Neo-structural 
sociology has long contributed to research 
in this area (compared, for example, with 
Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008; Glückler, 
Suddaby & Lenz, forthcoming) not only by 
framing institutionalization in these terms 
but by explaining the efficiency of high-
status inconsistency. This efficiency relies 
on the agents’ ability to lose status on one 
dimension and use a rhetoric of sacrifice to 
‘manage the losers’ of the institutionaliza-
tion process (Lazega, 2001) – i.e. to man-
age actors who stand to lose out from 
changes in the rules. These multi-status ol-
igarchs are not just boundary spanners: 
they are improbable linchpins with high 
probability of being either sidelined or 
punching above their weight. They have to 
choose, for example, between broadening 
their constituency (with a view to the long-
term stability of the institution) and estab-
lishing oligarchic closure.  
 Indeed, since actors organize their 
collective action around projects and rules, 
changing the rules is equivalent to break-
ing promises made to these actors. Using a 
position of high-status inconsistency is ef-
ficient in terms of institution building 
when actors are able to combine a form of 
power (control of resources that others 
need, i.e. finance, expertise, technique, 
time, law, etc.) with a form of legitimacy 
(discourse on behalf of the collective about 
the value of the new norms that is consid-
ered credible and compatible with its over-
all project). This credibility is increased 
when change of rules is presented as a 
cause of loss of status for the institutional 
entrepreneurs themselves. This loss of sta-
tus is often presented as personal ‘sacri-
fice’ of status for the common good. But 
this loss is very relative, if not false, when 
this ‘sacrifice’ jeopardizes one dimension 
of status without jeopardizing the other 
high and uncorrelated dimension of status. 
Combined with other factors, this justifica-
tion of broken promises is thus more likely 
to obtain normative alignment from the 
losers of the process – those who had pre-
viously organized themselves around the 
former rules – without forcing the entre-
preneurs to lose all forms of status. Losing 
out on one dimension of status (while still 
keeping the other dimension) is thus 
equivalent to rhetorical creation/purchase 
of much needed legitimacy. Electoral poli-
tics rely very often on this rhetoric of ‘loss’ 
of status that institutional entrepreneurs 
claim to accept for the general interest. Ex-
amples of such ‘sacrifices’ are provided in 
the two illustrations below.  
 
Collegial oligarchy, weak culture and 
normative alignments 
 
The strength of these actors (their Weberi-
an Herrschaft) is increased when they are 
able to join forces in what we call a colle-
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gial oligarchy. Institutional entrepreneur-
ship is strengthened in a regulatory college 
bringing together several persons with 
high-status inconsistency and conflicts of 
interests. This helps to draw a wide variety 
of constituencies into the process. Togeth-
er, multi-status oligarchs become both ver-
tical and horizontal linchpins in multiple, 
potentially conflicting domains and levels 
of regulation. Together they are able to ne-
gotiate, select and stabilize not only the 
formulation of new norms, but also the 
conventions and interpretations of these 
priority norms (Favereau and Lazega, 
2002).  
The main reason for which the 
creation of a collegial oligarchy is efficient 
in bringing together structure, culture and 
collective agency is that a group of hetero-
geneous leaders, even fraught with initial 
disagreements, diverse constituencies, or 
antipathies, can evolve over time. Years, 
often decades, of common and discrete 
collaboration create proximities, personal-
ized relationships and fragile structural 
equilibria where mutual critique decreases 
over time. Being in a collegial regime of 
personalized relationships reduces the ca-
pacity to challenge others’ normative 
choices, to disagree. Members use their 
personalized relationships because they fa-
cilitate discussion over time – even when 
these are not necessarily quiet relation-
ships. The important feature of this colle-
gial and oligarchic closure is that it ex-
cludes stakeholders that would not agree 
with the regulatory solutions and compro-
mises hammered out as ‘weak culture’ 
(Schultz and Breiger, 2010). This notion 
suggests that one can draw new and differ-
ent actors (foreigners) into this process 
with the right choice of words. Oligarchic 
closure and cross-cutting networks have 
consequences for political participation: if 
you are not at the table, you are on the 
menu. 
 
Applications and developments in neo-
structural economic sociology 
 
Regulation and institutionalization – ap-
proached from the perspective of the 
strong political influence of ‘improbable’ 
multi-status oligarchs with high-status in-
consistency and rhetorical skills – are 
among the processes that we have studied 
the most7 in neo-structural economic soci-
ology. It has been productive to invest in 
this field of research because it was char-
acterised by an era of ‘governance’. In this 
era, the command and control framework 
of states weakened and business was trying 
even harder than usual to take advantage of 
high-status inconsistency and conflicts of 
interests to build its own self-contained 
normative spaces where it could define the 
rules and the dual dimension of joint regu-
lation of markets without politicians and 
citizens interfering with their institutional 
entrepreneurship.  
To illustrate this neo-structural ap-
proach, let me present two cases of institu-
tionalization of new norms in business-
related judicial institutions (Lazega, 2003), 
one French and one European, looking at 
how relational infrastructures and high-
status inconsistencies are mobilized in 
these institutionalization processes. These 
are studies of how business takes ad-
vantage of high-status inconsistency, con-
flicts of interests and the dual dimension of 
joint regulation of markets, most often 
with strong but discreet help from public 
authorities8. In these studies, the main in-
stitutional entrepreneurs are judges who 
are not shy of exposing the political di-
                                                 
7  We have tried to combine these elements in 
a cycle of conferences called Réseaux et ré-
gulation that lasted 20 years (1996–2016) 
and that was set up and organized together 
with Lise Mounier. 
8  It is not the place for a detailed description 
of face-to-face interviews (with sociometric 
questions, reconstitutions of careers, open-
ended questions, vignettes, etc.) of actors 
involved in institutional entrepreneurship 
(renegotiation of new norms) and the usual 
difficulties of ‘studying up’. 
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mension of their work. The first study 
looks at how the financial industry has 
captured a judicial institution, the Com-
mercial Court of Paris (2000–2005). The 
second study looks at the currently emerg-
ing European Unified Patent Court. Both 
raise anew Selznick’s (1949) old issues of 
how to design public institutions in a world 
of governance (to use today’s vocabulary) 
where an institution becomes a different 
thing to different people, and where each 
stakeholder pushes towards goal drift.  
 
Promoting norms at the Commercial Court 
of Paris (2000–2005) 
 
The Commercial Court of Paris is a 450-
year-old court specialized in commercial 
litigation and bankruptcy. It is the first-
level judicial institution enforcing, creating 
and updating business norms. The 1807 
French Code de Commerce was written by 
its President. Heterogeneous, high and in-
consistent dimensions of the social status 
of the judges in this court come from the 
fact that they are all business persons, of-
ten successful executives or entrepreneurs, 
and at the same time officers of justice 
with the highest possible probity expected 
from (sworn-in) civil servants/judicial 
judges. The institution is truly judicial, and 
delivers fast, cheap, pragmatic, precedent-
based justice using a special ‘practical’ 
procedure. Judges are not just business 
people, but also voluntary lay judges (50% 
with a law degree) who are endorsed by an 
industry and coopted by their peers. 45% 
are retired and 55% are still paid by their 
employers or own their own company (in 
2000). The composition of the court is 
characterised by an over-representation of 
the financial industry (38% of all judges 
are bankers and insurers). The building 
sector, another highly litigious sector, 
sends in 10% of the judges. There are 
many examples of how these judges do 
punch above their weight. One example is 
provided by the story of how they saved 
the French banking sector from bankruptcy 
in the 1990s (Lazega, Mounier, Lemaire, 
2017). Another example is the very resili-
ence of this institution thanks to its built-in 
problem of conflicts of interests and insti-
tutional capture.  
This court has a strong formal or-
ganization, with a rule that judges rotate 
each year around its carrousel of 20 cham-
bers. We have used the metaphor of the 
spinning top to model the combination of 
these organized mobilities (rotation) and 
emergence of a pecking order in the dy-
namics of the advice networks among all 
these judges (Lazega, Lemercier, Mounier, 
2006). High-status inconsistency is obvi-
ous and conflicts of interests are institu-
tionalized (Lazega & Mounier, 2012), as 
shown by the composition of the chambers 
in this court in 2000, illustrated by Figure 
1. In this figure, bankers are in pink. Banks 
are the main creditors in the economy; the 
very simple fact that so many bankers sit in 
bankruptcy chambers illustrates the level 
of institutional capture.  
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Figure 1: Status inconsistency and conflicts of interests at the Commercial Court of Paris: Composi-
tion of Chambers in 2000. Judges-bankers in pink 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the domination of bankers also 
extends, beyond bankruptcy chambers, to 
epistemic domination in the other activities 
of this court. To show this, we measured 
the advice network among these judges in 
2000, 2002 and 2005, as represented in Fi-
gure 2. An analysis of this dataset using 
Snijders and Nowicki’s (1997) stochastic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
blockmodelling shows that, in these net-
works, bankers with a law degree are con-
sistently the most central advisors for their 
peers. Statistical analyses (mentioned 
above) of the dynamics of this structure 
confirm how this collegial oligarchy con-
trols the court epistemically. 
  
Bankruptcy 
chambers 
Bankruptcy 
chamber 
Chamber of Appeal 
against decisions made 
by bankruptcy chambers  
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Figure 2: How do bankers exercise epistemic control in the court and dominate as multi-status oli-
garchs? Cyclical dynamics (centralization-decentralization-recentralization) of status in advice net-
works among all judges 
Red: Super-central core, Green: 1st Semi-periphery, Yellow: 2nd Semi-periphery,  
Blue: Periphery 
 
Wave 1 
  
 
Wave 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wave 3 
 
The three figures visualize the cyclical dynamics (centralization-decentralization-recentralization) of 
status in the advice network among the judges in the court. Core, semi-peripheries and periphery iden-
tified with Snijders & Nowicki’s (1997) stochastic blockmodelling. Source: Lazega, Sapulete & Mou-
nier (2011).
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The evolution of social and epistemic sta-
tus in these cyclical dynamics is indeed 
characterized by the capacity of this hand-
ful of members to keep their epistemic au-
thority and maintain their highest centrality 
scores over time: they surf at the top of a 
wave of centralization, decentralization 
and recentralization of the system that was 
measured in this case.  
Thus, and importantly from a neo-
structural perspective focused on institu-
tionalization, the multiple dimensions of 
status of these specific actors in this sys-
tem are high, inconsistent and stable rela-
tive to the cyclical dynamics of the system. 
This capacity creates a competitive ad-
vantage in the struggle to define the priori-
ty norms in the court. 
Bankers with a law degree not only 
exercise epistemic control but also use this 
control to promote specific norms in the 
court. We measured normative controver-
sies in the court and asked each judge to 
read jurisprudential cases summarizing 
these controversies, to use their discretion 
in judicial decision making, and to discuss 
them with us in face-to-face interviews. 
One of the cases concerned ‘predatory 
prices’ and assessment of punitive damag-
es in a case of unfair competition. We 
found that money does talk in this institu-
tionalization process: bankers were spread-
ing self-serving norms of non-punitivity 
for such damages. Snijders’ Siena models 
(Lazega, Mounier, Snijders and Tubaro, 
2012) of increasing super-centrality of 
bankers with a law degree over time 
helped us track the expected dynamics, ex-
posing the fact that no pure normative ho-
mophily was driving this spread of non-
punitivity. It was rather reflexive align-
ment of the majority of judges on the nor-
mative choices of the super-central bankers 
(multi-status oligarchs) who achieved 
normative steering of the court by building 
epistemic authority thanks to their super-
centrality combined with predictable rheto-
rics of status sacrifice: ‘We [banks] could 
benefit from the current excess of punitivi-
ty, but punitivity in principle is bad for the 
economy’. Other judges aligned their nor-
mative choices with those of these multi-
status oligarchs. 
This institutionalization process is 
not driven by pure normative choices. It is 
rather driven by normative choices com-
bined with specific relational infrastructur-
al dynamics in two processes. Firstly, by a 
dialectic of overload for the super-central 
members (who cannot answer all the re-
quests for advice) and normative conflicts 
(Lazega, Sapulete and Mounier, 2011). 
Secondly, by the carrousel of chambers 
across which judges are rotated once a 
year, with many non-random infractions to 
the rule and a limited time horizon for all, 
including for the members in the core 
emerging from the movement. Driven by 
rotation and induced by delegation and 
turnover in these advice networks, oscilla-
tion (centralization, decentralization, re-
centralization) produces a form of rewiring 
that signals to most judges whose norma-
tive choices survive in these normative 
controversies.  
This first example confirms the capac-
ity of the neo-structural theory to account 
for this institutionalization. Our second ex-
ample also involves judges punching 
above their weight in institution building. 
 
Institutionalization of new norms for the 
European Unified Patent Court 
 
This second case is about institutionaliza-
tion of common norms at the emerging Eu-
ropean Unified Patent Court that is meant 
to build a unified intellectual property (IP) 
regime for all European countries. It is 
based on the same approach as in the pre-
vious example, this time with judges work-
ing at the international level to build this 
judicial institution (scheduled to come into 
existence in 2018). It starts with a familiar 
pattern of EU institution building, begin-
ning with the failure of European national 
governments to agree on common solu-
tions and to concentrate enough power at 
the European level to impose such institu-
tions (Dehousse, 1999; Thatcher, 2002). 
Here institutional entrepreneurs are corpo-
rate lawyers specialized in patents, repre-
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sentatives of a public/private regulator (the 
European Patent Office, EPO) and activist 
European judges with high-status incon-
sistency (civil servants openly involved in 
lobbying and political work). The position 
of these judges can also be characterized 
by high-status inconsistency because they 
openly cross the lines of division of pow-
ers – thus aggrandizing their role in de-
mocracy. This lobbying for the creation of 
a transnational court to enforce a legal in-
strument, the European patent created in 
1973, was accompanied by work trying to 
create a common interpretation (‘harmoni-
zation’) of the European patent. 
Indeed, the normative controver-
sies, both substantive and procedural, 
about the interpretation of this patent con-
cern the assessment of the ‘inventive step’ 
of an invention, the determination of the 
scope of protection afforded by the patent, 
the involvement of technical experts, and 
the use by judges of personal rules consid-
ering patents either as exceptions to the 
rule of copying or as rewards for the inven-
tor. These disagreements led to a frag-
mented normative space in European IP. 
An example concerning an anti-depressant 
drug called Escitalopram is a good illustra-
tion. Generic supplier companies have long 
sought the revocation of a basic patent held 
by a pharmaceutical company that first 
synthesized this molecule. A Dutch court 
in The Hague decided on complete cancel-
lation of the product and process claims for 
lack of an ‘inventive step’. In Germany, 
the Bundespatentgericht decision was the 
same. However, a decision of the French 
Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris was 
that the product claims by the pharmaceu-
tical company were valid. In the United 
Kingdom, a first instance court decided to 
invalidate the product claims, but for a dif-
ferent reason (namely insufficiency of dis-
closure). The case is still regularly revisit-
ed. This fragmentation facilitates forum 
shopping by multinational companies, and 
the emergence of ‘zombie’ patents. 
Prodded and assembled by the cor-
porate lawyers and by EPO, activist Euro-
pean IP judges started to network and con-
vene at the so-called Venice Forum, a 
field-configuring event, to lobby for the 
construction of this European court and 
work together on harmonizing their inter-
pretations by hammering out a ‘European 
Compromise’. Where governments failed, 
a small collegial oligarchy of super-central 
judges emerges from these events and is 
poised to create the new European IP re-
gime. This collegial oligarchy of judges is 
perceived by their peers as primi inter 
pares who should sit on the future Court of 
Appeal of the UPC and make decisions 
that will create a common jurisprudence. 
Three different networks of European 
judges were measured at the Venice Fo-
rum: the network of national and foreign 
peers (present at the Venice Forum) with 
whom judges personally discussed patent 
issues; the network of national and foreign 
peers whose decisions they read; and the 
network of national and foreign peers 
whose decisions they had actually cited at 
least once in their own decisions. Figures 
3.1 to 3.4 identify the most central high-
status inconsistency Venice Forum judges 
assembled in a ‘conclave’9, or collegial ol-
igarchy that was both central in the three 
networks of transnational social exchanges 
observed among these judges at the Venice 
Forum, and in a fourth network of judges 
considered to be representatives of the fu-
ture uniform position about patents in Eu-
rope (henceforth called ‘uniform net-
work’). Note that the reference network 
(respondent i cites explicitly – in his/her 
own decisions – decisions made by foreign 
judges j) is the sparsest network because 
explicit reference to work of foreign judges  
is forbidden in some countries (for exam-
ple France), but it remains the main net-
work in terms of influence. 
                                                 
9  This word was used by lawyers and judges 
themselves. For example: ‘On a personal 
level, cohabitation – almost in a conclave – 
allowed us to get to know and appreciate 
each other (…) Patent judges from the main 
European intellectual property countries 
confronted their points of view, sometimes 
very frankly, but always with courtesy’. 
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Figures 3.1–3.3: The Venice Forum collegial oligarchy: Three different networks of European judges 
measured at the Venice Forum 
 
Figure 3.1: Reading network 
 
Figure 3.2: Discussion network 
 
Figure 3.3: Reference network 
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Figure 3.4: Uniform network. Judges perceived by their peers as closest to a future uniform European 
position (the future ‘European Compromise’, if any)
 
 
*: Super-central judges. Source: Lazega (2012) 
 
 Multi-status oligarchs, i.e. super-
central UK, German, Dutch judges, domi-
nate this heterogeneous set of 38 Venice 
Forum judges. Losers are French, Southern 
and Central European judges.  
Super-centrality in the uniform 
network is explained at 99% by centrality 
in the three other networks, by member-
ship in a block of countries sharing the 
same kind of capitalism, and by judges’ 
use of experts in the legal procedure (a dis-
criminant feature separating the UK from 
the Continent at the time). Analysis of the 
judges’ positions in the controversy com-
bined with their positions in the networks 
shows a slightly chaotic situation: personal 
ties between judges across borders do not 
lead (automatically) to convergence and 
‘harmonization’. At the time (2009), judg-
es actually disagreed on several key issues 
with the peers that they had selected as the 
future representatives of the Unified Euro-
pean position. These super-central judges 
at the core of the network, the future rule 
makers according to their peers, also did 
not agree with each other (yet). This analy-
sis of the Venice Forum relational infra-
structure identified the judges who later 
came up with the 2016 Rules of Procedure 
of the UPC, a compromise based on rhetor- 
 
 
ical/possible ‘sacrifices’ of distinctive pro-
cedural features of each big country’s na-
tional ‘legal culture’: orality and adversari-
al procedures by the UK; saisie-
contrefaçon by France; and bifurcation by 
German judges. Lazega, Quintane and 
Casenaz (2016) provide ERGM analyses 
of the emergence of this uniform network 
and identify the costs for each of the Ven-
ice Forum judges in terms of alignment 
upon the kind of judge whom they have se-
lected in this uniform network. Based on 
future ‘forced’ normative alignments, win-
ners of the institutionalization process are 
Germany and the UK, losers are Southern 
and Central Europe. Here again, this case 
confirms the capacity of the neo-structural 
theory of institutional entrepreneurship 
outlined above to account for the construc-
tion of this institution. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To sum up, people are not equal in their 
capacity to defend their regulatory inter-
ests: some punch above their weight by 
bringing together structure and culture to 
shape collective agency, process by pro-
cess, particularly regulatory and institu-
tionalization processes in political work.  
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Neo-structural institutionalism (Lazega, 
2001, 2012a, 2016) shows how helpful it is 
to identify specific relational infrastruc-
tures in socially organized settings to help 
model processes of regulation and institu-
tionalisation of norms and practices. Insti-
tutionalization is characterised by specific 
social dynamics of oligarchical negotiation 
of ‘precarious values’ (Selznick, 1957) and 
stabilization in interpretation of the rules 
en vigueur. In these dynamics, institutional 
entrepreneurs with heterogeneous and in-
consistent forms of social status (measured 
also in network terms) can have a particu-
lar influence in promoting their regulatory 
interests: when defining priority rules; 
when using a rhetoric of relative sacrifice 
to build legitimacy and manage the losers; 
when articulating and synchronizing regu-
lation levels as vertical linchpins. High-
status inconsistency is indeed the main 
characteristic of relational infrastructures 
mobilized in institutionalization of contro-
versial norms. The added value of taking 
into account the real complexities of high-
status inconsistencies was illustrated in 
two different cases. Analogies between the 
two cases are not superficial: the same 
concepts (relational infrastructure, status 
heterogeneity and inconsistencies, conflicts 
of interests, multi-status oligarchs, collegi-
al oligarchy, rhetorics of building legitima-
cy and credibility) and measurements 
prove useful in accounting for institution-
alization.  
In the neo-structural model of the 
regulatory process, and in politics in gen-
eral, individuals do not just represent 
themselves. Here they represent organiza-
tions, professions, their country, their type 
of capitalism, or even legal cultures10. This 
means that the process is necessarily a 
multi-level one, with superimposed forms 
of collective agency, justifying the scien-
tific work at the level of granularity pre-
                                                 
10 Legal cultures could be considered to be a 
level of collective agency if they are defined 
as dramaturgies, i.e. as involving a text, a 
scenario, players, roles, strategies, skills and 
all the ingredients of a play.   
sented here. For example, judges and coun-
tries represent different levels. Within-
country relations between judges as nodes 
differ essentially from between-country re-
lations between judges, which is distinct 
from between-country relations, where 
countries are the nodes. What is therefore 
needed in further exploration of this insti-
tutionalization process is a combined dy-
namic and multi-level perspective 
(Snijders, 2016, 2017). Indeed, neo-
structural institutionalism requires new and 
richer kinds of data structures, modelling 
the emergence of an institution using more 
powerful stochastic actor-oriented models 
for dynamic multi-level networks, and per-
haps new measures. For example, since 
these dynamics are multi-level, synchroni-
zation11 issues between levels also emerge 
in institutionalization. Related to synchro-
nization and its costs, since institutionali-
zation is so oligarchical and driven by 
closed and collegial elites, how should the 
widening democratic deficit that comes at-
tached to the process, and that has been 
criticised in the public debate over the last 
few years – especially in relation with the 
public/private dimension of such institu-
tions – be questioned? Such questions 
show that it is necessary, for a better un-
derstanding of the relation between struc-
ture and process, to articulate a neo-
structural institutionalism (that exploits the 
critical potential of network analyses of 
dynamic multi-level systems of interde-
pendences) with the political and cultural 
institutionalisms that prevail in sociology 
today. In that respect, much remains to be 
done.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Synchronization refers here to the construc-
tion of intermediary-level relational infras-
tructures where actors combine temporali-
ties of collective action taking place above 
and below their intermediary-level, and try 
to behave in a way compatible with their 
own interpretations of norms coming from 
both upper and lower levels (Lazega, 
2016c). 
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